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Integrating Systemic Accident Analysis into 
Patient Safety Incident Investigation Practices 
 
Abstract: 153 words. Manuscript text: 4429 words. 
Abstract 
There is growing awareness of the limitations of current practice regarding the 
investigation of patient safety incidents, including a reliance on Root Cause Analysis 
(RCA) and a lack of safety expertise. Human Factors and Ergonomics (HFE) can 
offer safety expertise and systemic approaches to incident analysis. However, HFE 
is underutilised in healthcare. This study aims to explore the integration of HFE 
systemic accident analysis into current practice. The study compares the processes 
and outputs of a current practice RCA-based incident analysis and a Systems 
Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP) analysis on the same 
medication error incident. The STAMP analysis was undertaken by two HFE 
researchers with the participation of twenty-one healthcare stakeholders. The 
STAMP-based approach guided healthcare stakeholders towards consideration of 
system design issues and remedial actions, going beyond the individual–based 
remedial actions proposed by the RCA. The study offers insights into how HFE can 
be integrated into current practice.  
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1 Introduction 
High risk industries such as aviation, nuclear, rail and healthcare use accident and 
incident investigation to learn from failure and create action plans to avoid future 
incidents (Salmon et al., 2011). Within healthcare there is growing awareness of 
issues with current practice in incident investigation, with questionable quality of 
investigations and analysis resulting in ineffective recommendations and action plans 
(Wu et al., 2008; Peerally et al., 2016; Kellogg et al., 2016). Limitations identified 
include an over reliance on the promotion of a single flawed reductionist approach, 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and a lack of utilisation of external safety expertise (Wu 
et al., 2008; Peerally et al., 2016; Kellogg et al., 2016). Human Factors and 
Ergonomics (HFE) has developed expertise in systems safety and applied various 
systemic approaches to incident analysis. HFE’s systemic accident analysis and 
system design approaches have been developed for use in complex work systems 
(Leveson, 2012; Hollnagel, 2012; Rasmussen, 1997) and are judged to be better 
suited to forming an understanding of accidents in complex high-risk industries, as 
compared to traditional causal event chain techniques, such as Root Cause Analysis 
(Salmon et al., 2011; Leveson, 2004; Hollnagel, 2004). 
The potential of systemic accident analysis in healthcare such as Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004), AcciMap (Rasmussen 
and Svedung, 2000) and Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 
2012) has been demonstrated through analysis undertaken by experienced external 
method experts (e.g. Leveson et al., 2016; Karsh et al., 2014; Alm and Woltjer, 2010). 
However, systemic accident analysis has had little exposure to healthcare 
stakeholders that undertake incident investigations in current healthcare practice. A 
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potential avenue for HFE to have a beneficial impact on healthcare is by facilitating 
healthcare stakeholders to apply systems approaches to their incident investigation 
(Waterson and Catchpole, 2016).  
The current study aims to investigate the application of an HFE-led systems 
approach to healthcare incident analysis. Taking into account the time constraints of 
healthcare stakeholders the study asks how collaboration between HFE and 
healthcare can facilitate system thinking and guide analysis towards 
recommendations of more effective remedial actions.   
2 Methods 
2.1 Setting 
The study is centred on a medication error incident (an insulin overdose case from a 
prescription error) involving two healthcare providers in the UK serving a population 
of around one million; an acute trust employing over 14,000 staff with a 900-bed 
hospital and a trust providing community health services which employs over 5,000 
staff. The incident involved a patient being administered an overdose of insulin on 
three occasions following a drug prescription error. Drug prescription errors have 
previously been identified as the most common type of medication error (Leape et al., 
1995; Bates et al., 1995) and in the UK, it is believed that up to 1.5% of hospital 
prescriptions may contain a medication error (Dean et al., 2002). 
The events leading up to the incident can be summarised as: A patient was admitted 
to a hospital emergency department following a fall at home and subsequently 
transferred between wards. After being found to have high blood glucose level a 
review by a diabetes specialist nurse (DSN) suggested the patient to start insulin 
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glargine U100 10 units once per day. The recommended dosage was misread by the 
prescribing doctor and 100 units were prescribed instead of 10 units. The high 
dosage was administered twice at one provider ward and then following discharge to 
another provider ward, a further time before the error was identified by an advanced 
nurse practitioner. 
2.2 Incident analysis: current practice 
Prior to this study, a formal investigation of this incident was undertaken through 
Root Cause Analysis by a team of healthcare professionals following the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) level one investigation profile (NPSA, 2008): Level 
one is a most commonly used concise investigation for incidents that resulted in no, 
low or moderate harm to the patient. This investigation team included an 
investigation chair, 2 team leads and 7 team members. Information gathered by this 
team included interviews with key staff involved in the incident, statements from 
nursing and medical staff involved in the incident, a review of an incident report form, 
review of medical and nursing records, and review of procedures and protocols. The 
report from this investigation was subsequently used as the initial basis for the 
systemic accident analysis and the results from both analyses were compared. 
2.3 Systemic accident analysis 
Based on the RCA-based investigation report, a systemic accident analysis 
approach using Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP) 
(Leveson, 2012) was applied through two healthcare stakeholder workshops 
facilitated by two Human Factors and Ergonomics (HFE) researchers with the 
following profiles:  
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1. Junior HFE researcher, a graduate member of the Chartered Institute of 
Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF) whom had previously graduated 
from an MSc in Ergonomics and Human Factors, currently PhD researcher on 
healthcare systems ergonomics. This researcher acted as the main facilitator 
and analyst. 
2. Senior HFE researcher, a Chartered Ergonomist and Human Factors 
specialist and Lecturer in systems HFE with 14-year research experience in 
healthcare ergonomics. This researcher oversaw and supervised the analysis. 
The two HFE researchers conducted an initial STAMP-based incident analysis 
based on the data from the RCA report. The STAMP approach was chosen due to its 
application of systems theory and detailed analysis of the behaviour shaping 
mechanisms in the decision-making of individuals. This has been shown to be a 
powerful combination in understanding why an accident happened and how to best 
design remedial actions to prevent future occurrence, with some evidence of 
successful use in a healthcare context (Leveson et al., 2016).      
STAMP describes an accident in terms of a hierarchy of control based on adaptive 
feedback mechanisms and models the hierarchical safety control structure present in 
the system to enforce safety constraints (Leveson, 2012). This type of approach to 
accident analysis aims to overcome the limitations in explaining accidents in terms of 
events, acts and errors (Leveson, 2012; Hollnagel, 2012; Rasmussen, 1997; 
Rasmussen et al., 1990). A general example of a safety control structure model is 
adapted for hospital application and provided in Figure 1. The control structure 
contains downwards arrows showing a reference channel with the information 
necessary to impose safety constraints on the level below and upwards arrows that 
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show the measuring channel with feedback returned up the hierarchy on how 
effectively constraints are being satisfied (Leveson, 2015). 
 
Figure 1 Generic safety control structure for hospital. Adapted from Leveson, 2004 
The process of applying STAMP to accident analysis is described fully elsewhere 
(Leveson, 2012), here it is simplified and summarised into the following eight steps:  
1. Identify the system and hazard involved in the incident 
2. Identify the safety-related constraints and responsibilities, associated with 
that incident 
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3. Document the safety control structure in place to enforce the safety 
constraints and control the hazard 
4. Determine the proximate events leading to the incident and analyse the 
frontline operations present at the lower level of the control structure  
5. Analyse the higher levels of the control structure determining how and why 
these managerial levels contributed to the inadequate control of the 
hazard 
6. Examine overall coordination and communication issues between 
controllers that could have contributed to the incident 
7. Determine any changes and weakening in the control structure that 
occurred over time and contributed to the incident  
8. Generate recommendations for remedial action and strengthening of the 
safety control structure (Leveson, 2012) 
The application of STAMP in this study contained several stages and these are 
summarised in Table 1 with detail on the people involved and the time taken to 
complete. Two HFE researchers carried out step 1-3 prior to step 4-8, which were 
carried out with healthcare staff.  
For step 1-3, two HFE researchers carried out the reanalysis of the RCA report using 
STAMP. The two researchers created a draft safety control structure model to be 
utilised in the subsequent healthcare stakeholder workshops.  
Table 1 Systemic accident analysis process 
Steps People involved Means (time) Outputs 
STAMP step 1-3 
(Reanalysis of the RCA 
report) 
Senior and junior HFE 
researchers  
5 hours Safety control structure 
Preparation of material 
for workshops 
Senior and junior HFE 
researchers 
8 hours Safety control structure 
templates 
Step-by-step method 
guide 
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Presentation slides 
STAMP step 4-8  
(Workshop 1 and 2)  
Senior HFE researcher 
Junior HFE researcher 
Additional researcher 
Eighteen healthcare 
stakeholders 
3 hours Validated safety control 
structure 
Ideas for 
recommendations 
Senior HFE researcher 
Junior HFE researcher 
Three healthcare 
stakeholders involved 
in RCA of the incident 
Healthcare stakeholder 
present at workshop 1 
2 hours Validated safety control 
structure 
Information on incident 
and healthcare work 
domain 
Ideas for remedial 
action 
Healthcare stakeholder 
feedback on approach 
Synthesis of workshop 
outputs and 
documentation of 
recommendations 
Junior HFE researcher 8 hours Recommendations for 
remedial action 
 
2.4 Workshops 
This study aimed to involve healthcare stakeholders in the systemic accident 
analysis with facilitation by external HFE researchers, since it is imperative to involve 
them to act as subject matter experts to validate STAMP’s system models (Hettinger 
et al., 2015) and develop more relevant and effective recommendations for change. 
This was done through two workshops; the workshops introduced accident analysis 
concepts and the STAMP approach presented by an HFE researcher. Following the 
introduction, the safety control structure system model was provided to the 
participants and they were invited to take part in the analysis using a step-by-step 
method guide. The first workshop aimed to develop recommendations for remedial 
action, in addition to this the second workshop aimed to evaluate the utility and 
usability of STAMP with feedback from the original RCA investigation team. 
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2.4.1 Workshop 1  
The first workshop was 3 hours in duration with 18 attendees from healthcare 
including members of local commissioning groups, patient safety managers, front 
line staff and patient representatives, facilitated by 3 HFE researchers. All of the 
participants were from the same regional healthcare where the incident occurred, but 
none of them were involved in the original RCA investigation. Following the 
introduction to STAMP the participants were asked to participate in the incident 
analysis, working in 3 separate groups each with a safety control structure system 
model, method guide and facilitation by an HFE researcher.   
2.4.2 Workshop 2 
The second workshop was 2 hours in duration and facilitated by the 2 HFE 
researchers. The workshop was attended by 4 healthcare professionals (with an 
average of 31 years healthcare experience), including 3 involved in the original RCA 
investigation. During this workshop, following the presentation of the concepts of 
STAMP, the safety control structure system model was validated and the participants 
were invited to contribute to the analysis, using the model and STAMP concepts as 
discussion points. At the end of the workshop the participants were asked to give 
feedback on the utility and usability of the STAMP approach. This workshop was 
audio-recorded.  
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3 Results 
3.1 Processes – Comparison between HFE-led STAMP and current 
practice RCA 
Key information from the RCA and STAMP processes is presented in Table 2. Along 
with the different analysis methods used, there were differences in the people 
involved, their areas of expertise and the approach to group work. The timescales 
set for completion of the investigation in the UK policy is 60 working days including 
15 days for internal governance approval. The actual time taken for the RCA process 
for this case was not recorded, but the team usually carry out investigation whilst still 
holding their clinical case load. A comparison of the time taken for each approach 
isn’t made but the HFE-led analysis required an additional 26 working hours by HFE 
experts to the previously completed investigation.  
Table 2 RCA and STAMP processes 
 RCA STAMP 
People involved Assistant Chief Nurse 
Patient Safety Coordinators 
Diabetes Consultant 
Consultant Nurse  
Lead Specialist Nurse 
Education and Practice Development 
Lead 
Senior Diabetes Specialist Nurse 
Medication Safety Lead Pharmacist 
Consultant Nurse 
HFE researchers 
Healthcare stakeholders  
 
Original investigation team 
members: 
Senior Diabetes Specialist Nurse 
Medication Safety Lead Pharmacist 
Consultant Nurse 
Expertise Work domain HFE with work domain input 
Time taken Unrecorded 26 hours 
Data used Interviews and written statements from 
staff involved in incident 
Incident report form 
Medical, nursing and electronic records 
Procedures and protocols 
RCA report 
Healthcare staff involvement in 
workshops  
Collaborative 
work 
Meeting 
Review group 
Workshops 
Analytical 
approach 
Linear cause-effect model with 
contributory factors 
Systemic model with control-
feedback focus 
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Representations 
used 
Fishbone diagram Safety control structure 
 
The RCA investigation was led by two Patient Safety Coordinators with a team of 
seven clinical staff and chaired by an Assistant Chief Nurse. The RCA used data 
from interviews and documentation which was analysed using time line, fishbone 
diagram and incident decision tree tools. This process can be described as 
predominantly work domain expertise led, using a linear cause effect analysis model. 
In contrast, the STAMP process was led by HFE expertise, with the facilitated 
participation of work domain experts through workshops, using a systemic accident 
analysis model. 
 
3.2 Outputs - Comparison between HFE-led STAMP and current 
practice RCA 
The RCA identified a root cause in the prescription error by the doctor following 
misinterpretation of the specialist nurse recommendation, stated as human error. 
Incorrect dose administration by the nurses was also identified as a service/care 
problem. These two issues were then the subject of further analysis using the 
incident decision tree and fishbone diagram.    
The RCA approach uses a contributory factors classification framework (NPSA, 2009) 
and maps identified factors to an Ishikawa fishbone diagram (Ishikawa, 1982; NPSA, 
2016) as seen in Figure 2. The classification framework encourages identification of 
contributory factors from an individual to organisational level and presents these in 
list form.  
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Figure 2 RCA Fishbone diagram 
 
The RCA can be contrasted with the STAMP approach where a qualitative model of 
the system is formed which includes modelling relationships and interactions 
between system components through control-feedback loops, as shown in Figure 3.  
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Patient
Management
Audits
Reports
Policies, procedures, 
form templates & training
Management
Audits
Reports
Policies, procedures, form 
templates & training
Clinical status
Physiological status 
inc. blood sugar
Supervision
Hospital Ward
Prescribing doctor
Diabetes specialist 
nurse (DSN)
Ward nurse
Pharmacy dispenser
Medication
Inc. insulin
Prescription
Medical notes
Assessment form
DSN mentor Ward managerSupervising consultant
Supervision
Work 
instructions
Rehabilitation Ward
Advanced nurse 
practitionerWard nurse
Discharge summary
Prescription
Pharmacy dispenser
Prescribing doctor
Prescription
Medication Inc. 
insulin
Medication
Inc. insulin
Medication
Inc. insulin
Supervision
Clinical status, physiological 
status inc. blood sugar, 
prescription chart &medical notes
Discharge summary
Prescription
Hospital Care Community Care
Clinical status, physiological 
status inc. blood sugar, 
prescription chart &medical notes
Figure 3 Safety control structure for insulin prescription and administration (simplified for readability) 
STAMP’s safety control structure model is used to identify weaknesses in the control 
structure and control-feedback flaws. STAMP considers four types of hazardous 
control actions (Leveson, 2012): 
i. Control actions necessary to enforce safety constraint are not given (control 
action not given) 
ii. The necessary control actions were provided too early or too late (incorrect 
timing) 
iii. Unsafe control actions were provided (unsafe control action given)  
iv. Control action stops too soon or is applied too long (incorrect duration) 
STAMP also analyses the behavioural shaping mechanisms for decision-making of 
the actors within that system in terms of a process or mental model. This being the 
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actor’s understanding of current system status which needs to be regularly updated. 
The mental model of a decision maker can be incorrect due to poor feedback and 
incorrect information about system status as illustrated in Figure 4. The identified 
control flaws are compared with the contributory factors identified by the RCA in 
Table 3. 
 
Doctor
Mental model
Correct prescription? 
yes/no
Unsafe control action: 
unclear handwritten 
treatment 
recommendation
Unsafe control action: 
incorrect dosage of insulin 
prescribed
Missing feedback: 
no immediate prompt to 
help identify error
Missing feedback: 
no check/communication 
with DSN
Safety responsibility:
Prescribe correct dosage of insulin
Pharmacy dispenser
Diabetes specialist nurse
 
Figure 4 STAMP analysis of individual controller 
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Table 3 RCA contributory factors and STAMP control flaws 
System level RCA identified contributory factors STAMP identified control flaws 
Diabetes 
specialist nurse 
Ambiguity in the recommendations in terms of written 
clarity 
Control flaw: Issue in communication and coordination with 
prescribing doctor 
Mental model: Recommendation correctly interpreted and 
correct prescription made 
Feedback flaw: No feedback post recommendation 
Doctor (hospital) 
 
Failure to further 
query the 
recommended 
dose 
 
Patient: Altered neurology, poor history of diabetes 
compliance. IV steroids falsely elevated blood glucose 
Task: New prescription should trigger check of dose 
Communication: Misread prescription 
Team: Advice written on form was unclear 
Training: Insulin e-learning not mandatory 
Working condition: Not doctor’s base ward 
Equipment: Glargine available in different strengths 
Control actions not given: Doctor did not question high 
recommended dosage or review suggestion thoroughly 
Mental model: Incorrect understanding of patient status and 
required prescription 
Feedback flaw: Coordination and communication issue in 
handwritten notes and lack of face-to-face handover at time of 
writing prescription 
No feedback after prescription made 
Nurse (hospital)  
 
Failure to query 
dose of the 
insulin prescribed 
Individual: Both nurses in post for 12 months or less with 
no previous competency issues 
Task: Glargine medication stock was on ward 
Communication: Dose not cross checked between form 
completed by specialist nurse and doctor’s prescription 
Team: Both nurses part of an established team 
Training: Insulin e-learning not mandatory for staff 
Working condition: Prescription completed on form, not 
electronic prescribing 
Control action not given: Nurse did not query the dosage 
except for with peers and did not cross-check with specialist 
nurse documentation or patient notes 
Mental model: Accepted doctor’s prescription as correct. 
Nurses recognised prescription as a large dose but they had 
seen large doses of insulin prescribed before 
Feedback flaw: The charts readily available to ward nurses 
had high dosage on them. The nurse questioned between 
themselves but not to specialist nurse or senior staff 
Pharmacy 
(hospital) 
Missed opportunity to identify the error when prescription 
checked prior to the patient being transferred 
Control action not given: Pharmacy did not cross-check 
prescription against patient records (medication stock was on 
ward). Prescription was checked prior to patient being 
transferred but issue not identified 
Mental model: Prescription is appropriate 
Organisational 
(hospital) 
Insulin safety identified as a high priority and 
implementation of a new safety strategy has begun 
A team of specialist diabetes nurses has been 
established 
 
Control action provided too late: Assessment form 
documentation not in format currently advised. Not updated 
until triggered by incident 
Nurse 
(Community) 
Previous administration of dose and discharge 
documentation provided rationale for nurse to administer 
dosage 
Control action not given: Nurse did not query the dosage 
Mental model: Accepted prescription as correct 
Feedback flaw: Medication dosage had been administered 
twice previously and on discharge documentation 
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The RCA focussed on the hospital doctor and nurses and the factors contributing to 
their involvement in the incorrect prescription and administration. The use of an incident 
decision tree tool, that seeks to determine the actor’s intention and blameworthiness of 
human error (Reason, 1997; Meadows et al., 2005), absolves those actors of blame, but 
this focus means less attention is paid to other areas of the system, as shown in Table 3. 
A major difference between RCA and STAMP is in STAMP’s modelling of the system. 
RCA does not model the relationships between system components and it does not 
build a model of the system. Contributory factors are attached to the identified service 
problem and presented in list form, whereas the control-feedback relationships 
presented in STAMP’s safety control structure provide analysis of interactions within the 
system.    
Another major difference is in STAMP’s explicit consideration of both the system 
operation and the system development or design as shown in Figure 1. The 
consideration of system design led the analysis to question the change management 
processes regarding specification, design, evaluation and approval of new information 
templates/forms to be used in a hospital. There was also questioning about the design 
of information systems, with information given to the prescribing doctor split between 
electronic and paper format.      
3.3 Recommendations 
Both analyses produced recommendations to prevent future incidents, with a summary 
of these presented in Table 4. In comparing the analyses recommendations, STAMP 
generated additional recommendations for system-level improvement, especially with 
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consideration that two system-level improvements from RCA referred to the initiatives 
which were already being conducted prior to the incident: i) the review and 
implementation of the new diabetes assessment form; ii) the implementation of insulin 
strategy. The RCA-based recommendations focussed on staff training and personal 
reflection, whereas the STAMP analysis broadened the discussion and 
recommendations to systemic issues (service development and change management), 
rather than just the operation management issues. 
Table 4 Recommendations for remedial action from two approaches 
Category of 
countermeasure 
RCA-based recommendations STAMP-based recommendations 
Individual behaviour - Personal reflection to be 
undertaken  
- Roll out and ensure compliance 
to insulin safety e- learning for all 
medical and nursing staff 
- Ensure doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists are given clear safety 
responsibilities (check and query) and 
understand these responsibilities 
Tools, technology and 
physical environment 
- Review and implement new 
diabetes assessment form 
 
- Review and implement new diabetes 
assessment form 
- Review electronic information system 
for potential inclusion of DSN treatment 
recommendation 
- Feedback to pharmaceutical company 
about name of medication 
Tasks and 
organisation 
- Implement insulin safety strategy 
(on-going) 
 
- Ward management to regularly 
reinforce to nurses the expectation to 
query prescriptions where there is a 
concern regarding dose or 
administration instructions 
- Ensure channels of enquiry to ward 
leadership or original treatment team 
are available 
- Ensure prescribers, dispensers and 
administrators of medication have 
comprehensive and clear information of 
patient status and treatment plan 
- Train DSN’s as prescribers to enable 
them to prescribe insulin at time of 
patient assessment 
- Design process to include DSN check 
with patient after administration of 
medication 
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Change management - None - Revise the design process 
(specification and testing) for form 
templates and other electronic and 
paper based information systems.  
- Revise the documentation review 
process. The review process needs to 
be able to efficiently manage change, 
with timely review and implementation 
of new documentation 
- Ensure future design of software 
includes specification and assessment 
of user needs 
 
3.4 HFE analysis workshop participant feedback 
The HFE researchers were not qualified healthcare professionals with the healthcare 
stakeholders played a vital role in providing work domain knowledge. The healthcare 
stakeholders contributed to the analysis and generation of recommendations. Feedback 
on the STAMP approach from the participants of the second workshop was generally 
positive; with all 4 participants agreeing that STAMP was useful in learning from the 
incident and that they would make additional recommendations based on the approach. 
The participants found the approach helped them think about the incident in a systemic 
way as shown in the following quotes by those who were involved in the original RCA 
investigation. 
‘The approach enables us to think more broadly about system controls and failure 
points’ 
‘Previously I felt my team were really to blame, but now I understand it was multifactorial’ 
‘It made me think of the interactions between people. All the groups/individuals involved’  
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On future application, all of them indicated that further experience with the method and 
HFE experts’ help would be required. 
4 Discussion 
This study has applied an HFE-led systemic accident analysis approach to healthcare 
incident analysis and demonstrated STAMP’s potential in healthcare. The use of 
STAMP and collaboration between HFE and healthcare stakeholders was found to 
facilitate systems thinking, impacting the thinking of some of the original investigators of 
the incident and guided the development of underlying system-based recommendations. 
4.1 Current practice and benefit of HFE input 
Although the HFE-led systemic accident analysis approach has proven useful, it is 
difficult to determine how much of the observed effect on analysis outcomes was due to 
the use of STAMP and how much was due to the presence and facilitation of HFE 
practitioners in the present study. The lack of knowledge about STAMP in healthcare 
meant the healthcare investigators were not capable of using it alone and it is assumed 
both HFE practitioner presence and use of a different accident model in STAMP 
contributed to the effect on analysis outcome. Previous research has suggested 
accident investigation and incident analysis can be influenced by several factors 
including the background and knowledge of the analyst (Rasmussen et al., 1990; 
Lundberg et al., 2010), the accident model used (Lundberg et al., 2009), the time and 
resources available for the investigation and proposed remedial actions being 
constrained by practical considerations (Lundberg et al., 2010). 
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Within this case study, groups with different backgrounds have taken part in the incident 
analysis; Healthcare stakeholders with specialist knowledge on the work domain and 
HFE researchers with HFE knowledge. Work domain knowledge is a vital part of the 
analysis and already seen as such, here it is argued that HFE knowledge is also a vital 
component for good quality analysis outcomes. With neither group of analysts holding 
the requisite knowledge from both domains a collaboration was needed. This 
collaboration has its challenges such as the limited time healthcare stakeholders can 
give and communication between the two professional groups with their different 
technical terms and jargon.  
In this study, the healthcare stakeholders were exposed to a specialist systemic 
accident analysis technique which is considered a difficult approach to use even by 
experienced investigators (Underwood et al., 2016). The healthcare stakeholders 
contributed to the systemic analysis but felt they would need support and further 
experience to apply the approach in future. On reflection, the facilitation by HFE experts 
can be more effective if focus is on the main thinking behind the systems approach 
rather than spending too much time on the details of STAMP, especially with time 
constraints considered.  
The use of a systemic accident model on top of the RCA cause-effect model will also 
influence the analysis outcome (Hollnagel, 2006; Lundberg et al., 2009). STAMP 
contains a combination of systemic thinking with qualitative systems modelling and 
detailed analysis of human decision making. While RCA included identification of 
contributory factors to incidents it lacked a description or explanation of the relationships 
and interactions between humans and components across the system. With 
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contributory factors presented in list form rather than providing efforts of system 
modelling. This limits the understanding of how these factors impacted on human 
decision making. The increased understanding of relationships and mechanisms formed 
in STAMP is shown to be of benefit to the development of remedial actions. 
4.2 Proposed remedial actions 
The initial healthcare staff led RCA analysis produced outcomes and remedies 
consistent with previous RCA investigations for drug error, with outcomes commonly 
reliant on staff education, which is reported as being a weak remedy in addressing 
adverse events (Mills et al., 2008). The HFE-led systemic analysis in this case proposed 
remedial actions to address system level issues, such as change management in 
service development. 
Consideration of the time it takes to undertake an investigation and the healthcare 
stakeholder time used up in the analysis is always prominent. Certainly, the HFE 
systemic analysis brought up questions that could be further analysed if time allowed. 
for example, the role of the pharmacy in checking the prescription which was only 
touched on. 
The type of remedial actions proposed and implemented after incident investigations 
are not only influenced by what is found in the analysis. Research involving interviews 
with investigators from multiple industries, including healthcare, has shown remedial 
actions are dependent on several factors including: what the analyst/organisation knows 
how to fix; if the remedies are possible to fix and under control of the organisation; and 
cost-benefit balance (Lundberg et al., 2010).  The commonly proposed healthcare 
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remedial actions of staff training and small policy change (Kellogg et al., 2016) are likely 
to be proposed due to the organisation knowing how to implement them, being under 
the control of the organisation and being easier (and cheaper) to implement than deep 
systemic issues. Indeed, many of the remedies suggested by the STAMP analysis 
would need further understanding and specification prior to implementation. Remedies 
such as changes to computerised systems are a serious undertaking, which may make 
analysts reluctant to propose this type of recommendation. Immediate actions might not 
be possible for such system-based interventions, but healthcare organisations can 
accumulate an evidence base for future changes, so they need to welcome and 
encourage proposals for system changes to be undertaken over the long-term, 
alongside quick fix remedial actions. 
4.3 Integrating HFE in healthcare incident analysis 
The addition of HFE input in this study took less than a working week of the HFE 
researchers’ time, and two to three hours for each individual healthcare stakeholder 
participant. The HFE expertise can be utilised throughout the whole investigation 
process, but can also be tapped at the last stage of analysis and recommendation 
development as demonstrated in this study. The major obstacle could be to get relevant 
healthcare stakeholders in the same location, at the same time, for the two to three 
hours needed for the workshops as we experienced in this study.  
Systemic analysis can be effectively used to conduct analyses on batches of similar 
incidents. Leveson, et al (2016) used 30 adverse cardiovascular surgery events using 
one safety control structure with various control flaws from all incidents overlaid. This 
both increases the quality of the analysis through the additional data and cuts the time 
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taken for each individual analysis. Although slowing the response to each individual 
incident these would be actioned through initial RCA analysis, with the HFE analysis 
providing a review process. In this way, HFE expertise can be effectively utilised in 
collaboration with healthcare professionals.  
5 Conclusions and future research 
The present study raises the possibility that HFE expert-facilitated systemic accident 
analysis with healthcare stakeholders can enable effective and efficient patient safety 
incident investigation identifying remedial actions on underlying system issues beyond 
individual issues. This study offers insights into how human factors expertise and 
approach can be integrated into patient safety incident investigation practice.  
This study is limited in having a single case study design, multiple case studies would 
improve generalisability. HFE practitioners could assist at organisational and/or regional 
level. Currently within UK healthcare serious incident reports are reviewed/approved at 
regional level by patient safety managers and HFE practitioner involvement could occur 
at this juncture. However, it is also possible that the ability to influence safety practice 
could be strengthened by working closely with healthcare providers through the 
collaborative incident investigation at organisational level. Research would also benefit 
from following the case through to implementation of change, which was not possible in 
this study.  
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Future studies would also benefit from multiple incident analysis and increased numbers 
of participants evaluating systemic approaches for usability and utility in different 
healthcare contexts and settings. 
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